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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether preference interactions can explain why risk preferences 
change over time and across contexts. We conduct an experiment in which subjects accept 
or reject gambles involving real money gains and losses. We introduce within-subject 
variation by alternating subjectively liked music and disliked music in the background. We 
find that favourite music increases risk-taking, and disliked music suppresses risk-taking, 
compared to a baseline of no music. Several theories in psychology propose mechanisms by 
which mood affects risktaking, but none of them fully explain our results. The results are, 
however, consistent with preference complementarities that extend to risk preference. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies find that risk preferences are not stable across contexts (see Barseghyan, 
Prince, and Teitelbaum, 2011, and Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, and Cullen, 2012 as examples of 
recent studies). This can be due to a behavioral bias, such as a framing effect. Alternatively, 
seemingly inconsistent behavior could be at least partly due to preference complementarites. 
Laibson (1999) presents a model of dynamic preferences in which environmental cues and 
consumption can act as compliments. For example, hearing the sound of ice falling into a 
whiskey tumbler may increase the marginal utility from consuming Scotch for some individuals. 
Laibson argues that preferences are sensitive to such cues, which explains why preferences can 
vary from one moment to another. Loewenstein (1996; 2000) also argues for a decision-making 
framework that incorporates similar preference interactions, but focusing on different types of 
visceral factors (negative emotions such as fear, drive states such as hunger, and feeling states 
such as pain). In addition to preferences for consumption items, similar processes could operate 
with preference for risk. We suspect that risk preference interactions may be particularly relevant 
in domains that simultaneously involve risky decisions and entertainment value. Examples of 
such domains include casino gambling, certain sports, recreational driving by young adults, and 
perhaps to some extent individual investors’ active trading in stocks.
1
In this paper we investigate the possibility of risk preference interactions using music as the 
source of complementary utility. Given such preference complementarity, a person might derive 
more utility from a risky gamble while listening to their favorite music, and would thus be more 
1 That entertainment value is one reason why individuals trade stocks is suggested by, e.g., Black (1986) and 
Barber and Odean (2000). 2
likely to accept the gamble. Music is a potentially powerful environmental factor, yet it operates 
in the background and does not consume conscious attention similar to, say, visual stimuli.
2 Both 
musical preferences and risk preferences show great variation amongst individuals (see North, 
Hargreaves, and Hargreaves, 2004, for music, and Dohmen et al, 2011, for risk). Differences in 
musical preferences have an impact on the kinds of emotions a single piece of music invokes in 
different people (Kreutz et al., 2008). These differences can lead to interesting preference 
interactions. For example, the Master of Puppets, a song by the famed thrash metal band 
Metallica, could invoke elation in one person and yet cause anxiety in another person, with 
correspondingly different effects on their marginal utilities for specific consumption items. 
We employ an experimental setting that makes it easier to attribute any findings to a 
preference complementarity rather than a psychological bias. However, we want to stress at the 
outset that our point is not to argue against the idea that behavioral biases matter. Rather, our 
purpose is to test whether changes in risk-taking could partially be due to genuine preference 
dynamics arising from preference complementarities. We do not see these approaches as 
mutually exclusive. 
We use binary-outcome, constant probability (50-50) gambles. We introduce two sources of 
variation. First, we varied the music being played in the background while the subjects were 
2 Music is being used in this capacity, e.g., as film music, for marketing purposes, and in therapy (for example, 
reducing stress after undergoing surgery (Macdonald et al., 2003)). Music also has the capacity to enhance stress: 
experimental subjects playing a violent videogame (Quake III) with its built-in music turned on, showed a higher 
blood concentration of stress hormone cortisol compared to other subjects playing the same game in silence (Hébert 
et al., 2005). Music can induce emotions via several psychological mechanisms, including rapid and automatic 
responses (e.g., brain stem reflex) and higher order cognitive functions (e.g., invoking a memory of a particular 
event). Juslin and Västfjäll (2008) provide a review of these mechanisms. 3
choosing whether to participate in the gambles. Each subject was asked to bring along to the 
experiment some of their favorite music as well as some music that they despised. In addition to 
the liked and disliked music, choices were also made under silence. Second, we varied the gain 
and loss payoffs of the gambles. The probabilities were held fixed, so this resulted in variation in 
the expected values. Each subject went through 256 gambles with different payoffs, and we 
identify the effects from within-subject variation in the gamble acceptance rates. Rather than 
repeating the exact same gamble over different musical conditions, changing the payoffs forces 
the subjects to reconstruct their utility functions. We believe this results in less anchoring to past 
choices. 
We chose teenagers (aged 12–17; N = 25) as experimental subjects for two reasons. First, 
music is an important consumption item in this age group. Second, it is easier to create effective 
monetary incentives due to the subjects’ low level of income. The loss amounts from a single 
gamble ranged from 0.5 to 2 euros, and the win amounts ranged from 2 to 4 euros. These 
amounts are roughly comparable to a couple of days worth of disposable income for the average 
subject.
We find that favorite music increases risk-taking, and disliked music depresses risk-taking 
relative to the baseline of no music. The frequency for accepting a gamble is 54.1% for good 
music versus 47.4% for bad music. When no music was playing the acceptance rate is 51.4%. 
The effects of music are evident in all kinds of gambles but the difference in acceptance rates in 
favor of liked versus disliked music is greatest (about 10 percentage points) when the ratio of 
gains to losses is 2:1 (see Figure 3 for a preview of the results). The positive effect of good music 
and the negative effect of bad music are both statistically significant at the 5% level under 
various alternative estimation methods. In particular, they are present in a logit regression with 4
subject fixed effects, in a random effects regression including surveyed subjective risk attitude as 
a control variable, and in the distribution of coefficients from subject specific regressions, when 
controlling for the gain and loss amounts of the gambles. 
These results are consistent with preference interactions of the type described by Laibson 
(1999) and Loewenstein (1996; 2000), and imply that such effects can extend to risk preference, 
in addition to preferences for consumption goods. Such preference structures can create what 
seems like unstable preferences in the context of the standard economic model of a constant risk 
preference in which the marginal propensity to take risk is independent of utility derived from 
other sources. In subsequent work involving neuroimaging methods, Halko et al. (2012) find that 
the behavioral effect of music on risk-taking, first documented in this paper, co-varied with brain 
activation in left amygdala. This evidence is consistent with our preference-based interpretation 
as the amygdala is known to be a key component of the value computation and coding of 
preference information (Seymour and Dolan, 2008). The preference-based interpretation is also 
consistent with the neuroimaging results of Berns et al. (2010) showing that the activation in the 
reward areas of the brain are proportional to subjective ratings of music. 
Alternatively, rather than having preference-based underpinnings, the results could arise 
through decision psychologic influences. Prior literature has proposed at least four mechanisms 
that mediate the effect of mood on risk-taking: mood maintenance hypothesis, subjective 
probability weighting, affect infusion, and impact on cognitive processing strategies. We defer a 
more detailed discussion of the psychological mechanisms to Section 6 of the paper, where we 
argue that none of these theories can adequately account for our findings. 5
2. Prior literature 
Several experimental studies link mood and risk-taking by way of a between-subjects study-
design, in which good/bad/neutral mood is being induced on the subjects in different 
experimental conditions. Yuen and Lee (2003) and Chou, Lee, and Ho (2007) use movie clips to 
induce different moods using happy, neutral, and sad content, respectively. They find that 
subjects in the negative mood condition are significantly less likely to take risks compared to 
those in the neutral group. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) find that subjects viewing a 
scene from a horror movie choose a significantly lower certainty equivalent in a hypothetical 
lottery question. 
However, people on good moods do not necessarily make riskier choices (Isen and Patrick, 
1983; Isen and Geva, 1987). Arkes, Herren, and Isen (1988) find that subjects on good mood shy 
away from risk-taking when the potential loss is emphasized. Nygren et al. (1996) find that 
subjects on good mood overestimate the probabilities of winning, yet are less likely to gamble. 
Overall the evidence is mixed. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that risky decisions can be 
affected by several cognitive biases. 
These papers do not attempt to make a connection to dynamic preferences. We believe that a 
within-subjects design, as used in this paper, is much better suited for that purpose. There are 
two related studies that also use a within-subjects design to study changes in the tendency to take 
risk, although focusing on different issues. In a neuroimaging study, Knutson et al. (2008) find 
that nucleus accumbens, a part of the brain associated with positive arousal, shows increased 
activation before financial risk-taking. In their experiment male subjects increased financial risk-
taking when they were anticipating to view rewarding stimuli (erotic pictures). Self-selected 
music, as used in this paper, is presumably more neutral a cue. In their experiment, as in ours, the 6
subjects know the probability distributions of the outcomes and thus their beliefs are fixed. 
However, in their experiments, unlike in ours, the subjects were shown the outcomes of their 
chosen gamble after each trial, as well as their cumulative earnings. Prior earnings have been 
shown to influence risk-taking (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; 
Coval and Shumway, 2005; Weber and Zuchel, 2005). In addition, subjects may get conditioned 
to associate a particular type of stimulus with a particular outcome. Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) 
also conduct a within-subjects analysis of risk-taking using images as stimuli. Their experiment, 
unlike ours, features a complex estimation task in which the subjects must infer an unknown 
payoff probability distribution from the outcomes they observe. 
3. Methods
We recruited 25 adolescents (aged 12–17 years) in Helsinki, Finland, in spring 2009, by 
announcing an invitation to participate in an experiment that concerns music and attitude towards 
monetary gains and losses. Participants were told that the experiment consists of two separate 
sessions. For the first session they were asked to select, and bring with them four pieces of their 
favorite music and four pieces of music they disliked (on music CDs or mp3-files). We recognize 
the possibility that locating and bringing in the disliked music requires more effort than what is 
required for the favorite music. If this is indeed the case the impact of disliked music could be 
understated in our empirical tests. 
The announcement also explained the payment structure: the subjects would be paid 10 euros 
for participating in the first session, while earnings in the second session would depend on the 
decisions they make during the experiment as well as chance outcomes. The subjects could either 
win or lose money in the second session. We adopted this two-session structure to make the 7
subjects feel that they would face actual potential losses in the gambles, and less likely to feel as 
if they were “gambling with the house money”.
3 The maximum amount that the subjects could 
win was 20 euros, and the maximum amount they could lose was 10 euros. An informed consent 
was solicited from the subjects’ parents prior to the experiment. 
A. Session 1 
The eight pieces of music that each subject brought with them were first copied onto a 
computer for later use in the second session. The subjects then filled out a questionnaire 
surveying their risk attitude and some background information. The date of the second session 
was agreed on, leaving at least one week between the sessions. The fixed payment of 10 euros 
was paid and the subjects were reminded that in the second session they would participate in a 
computerized experiment in which one can either win or lose money. 
B. Session 2 
In the main experiment, which took place after at least a week had passed since session 1, the 
task of subjects was to accept or reject gambles that offered a 50–50 chance to win or lose 
money. Accepting a gamble, for example [1.50, –1.20], meant that the subject was willing to 
participate in a gamble that offered a 50% change of winning 1.50 euros and a 50% chance of 
loosing 1.20 euros. The experiment was conducted individually in a private room using a 
computer program. Figure 1A shows the computer screen plot for the aforementioned example. 
The gain and loss amounts were shown for 2.5 seconds, after which the subjects had 2.5 seconds 
to choose “accept” or “reject” by pressing designated buttons on the computer keyboard. After 
3 Subsequent to having carried out the experiments we came across a recent paper by Rosenboim and Shavit 
(2012) who argue and present supporting evidence in favor of this kind of prepaid mechanism that we used. 8
deciding on the gamble, there was a break of 0.5 to 3.5 seconds until the next gamble was shown. 
We varied the length of this break to avoid unreflected automatic responses and to keep the 
subjects focused. 
The results of the gambles were not shown during the course of the experiment. Knowledge 
on prior gains or losses can influence behavior (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Gneezy, Kapteyn, and 
Potters, 2003). While these effects are interesting in their own right, for the purposes of this 
paper they represent a confounding effect that we wanted to avoid. At the start of the experiment 
the subjects were informed that five randomly determined gambles would be played for real at 
the end of the session. There were 16 different win outcomes ranging from 1 to 4 euros, and 16 
loss outcomes ranging from 0.5 to 2 euros. Each subject went through the full payoff matrix and 
none of the gambles were repeated. This corresponds to 16 x 16 = 256 gambles (Figure 1B). 
Gambles were presented under three conditions: while the subjects’ favorite music was 
playing (64 gambles), while disliked music was playing (64 gambles), and gambles with no 
music playing (128 gambles). Sixteen gambles under one condition were assembled into a block 
of 80 second duration. Each block of music was followed by a block without music. The order of 
blocks was either L-L-D-D-L-L-D-D- or D-D-L-L-D-D-L-L- (where L stands for liked music, D 
for disliked music, and - for no music), counterbalanced across subjects (Figure 1C). During all 
conditions gambles were randomly drawn from the payoff matrix. We applied random sampling 
that ensured an even mix of different types of gambles under all three conditions (Figure 1B). 
The complete session lasted about 40 minutes. At the end, five gambles were randomly 
drawn, and the ones that the subject had accepted were played for real. Payoffs were determined 
by the roll of a dice (values of one to three indicated a loss, and four to six indicated a win). The 9
average total payment was 13.80 euros (SD = 3.93) which is, according to our survey, somewhat 
more than the average weekly disposable income for our subjects. 
The data of two subjects were discarded: one due to misunderstanding the task, and one due 
to a technical error with the music that was played. The analysis is thus based on data for 23 
subjects, 12 females and 11 males, mean age 14.6 years, SD = 1.62, range 12–17 years. 
4. Main results 
In the first session of the experiment, the subjects filled a questionnaire where we surveyed 
their risk attitude. They first rated their general willingness to take risk on a visual analog scale, 
that is, by indicating a position along a horizontal line, 10 cm in length, with the end-points 
labeled ‘Not willing to take risk’ and ‘Completely willing to take risk’. The distribution of the 
responses to the general risk question is depicted in Figure 2A. The average willingness to take 
risk was 5.07 (SD = 1.92). 
A risk neutral subject would be indifferent between participating in and rejecting a gamble 
with a win-loss ratio of 1:1. Even a normal risk-averse decision maker, provided that he or she is 
optimizing lifetime consumption and is not pathologically risk-averse, would accept a small-
scale gamble as long as the win-loss –ratio is slightly over 1 (Rabin, 2000). However, 
experimental studies show that people generally tend to be more sensitive to losses than to gains. 
Indifference between accepting and declining equiprobable binomial gambles typically obtains 
when the ratio of the win amount to the loss amount is 2:1 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tom 
et al., 2007). Figure 2B illustrates the distribution of the acceptance rates for the gambles for 
different combinations of gains and losses in our experiment. The acceptance rates are around 
50% along the diagonal where the ratio of the win amount to the amount of loss is 2:1, and 10
decrease when moving towards less favorable gambles. These results show that our adolescent 
subjects conform to the general population in their degree of loss aversion. 
Table 1 shows the impact of music on the tendency to participate in gambles. Univariate 
results reported in Panel A show that the frequency for accepting a gamble is 47.4% for bad 
music versus 54.1% for good music. When no music was playing the acceptance rate is 51.4%. 
Good music thus alleviates, and bad music exacerbates loss aversion. Figure 3 graphs the 
acceptance rates as a function of the win-loss –ratios of the gambles. The effect of music is 
evident in all kinds of gambles. The difference in acceptance rates in favor of liked versus 
disliked music is about 10 percentage points along the diagonal of the payoff matrix, that is, 
when the ratio of gains to losses is 2:1 (Figure 4). The mean effects of good music and bad 
music, compared to no music, are statistically significant at the 5% level under various 
estimation methods which we describe in detail in Section 4. 
One way of judging the magnitude of these effects is to consider an offsetting change in a 
gamble’s loss amount that is needed for keeping the acceptance rate statistically equal, while 
music is being varied. Calculated in this way, good music offsets a 3.1% increase in the loss 
amount, and bad music offsets a 4.6% reduction in the loss amount. These magnitudes are 
economically relevant. 
The effect varies for different types of gambles. Good music only slightly further increases 
acceptance rates among the most favorable gambles (above the payoff matrix diagonal) where 
acceptance rates are already high, but bad music still further lowers the acceptance rates in the 
least favorable gambles (below the payoff matrix diagonal). In these least favorable gambles the 
acceptance rate is only 16%. However, the impact of music, again judged against an offsetting 11
loss amount, is very large: a change of 25-30% in the loss amount is required to statistically 
offset the impact of either good or bad music on the acceptance rate. 
5. Multivariate analysis 
To assess the statistical significance and robustness of the result we estimate three types of 
regression models and implement two alternative assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity. 
We estimate all regressions with maximum likelihood and use standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Using all methods we find that subjectively liked music increases risk-taking, 
while disliked music decreases risk-taking, and the results are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
We start by estimating the propensity to accept a gamble using a linear probability model 
(OLS regression). The dependent variable (yij) is a binary choice variable representing an 
acceptance (“1”) or a rejection (“0”) of gamble  ^ ` 1,...,256 j  by subject  ^ ` 1,...,23 i  and the 
model is 
ij E j G ij B ij ij yE G B DE E E H      (1) 
where Ej is the expected value of gamble j, Gij and Bij are zero-one indicator variables for 
subjectively liked (“Good”) and disliked (“Bad”) music, respectively, being played while subject 
i was considering gamble j. The betas (E) represent the coefficients to be estimated with 
subscripts corresponding to the variables, and D is the constant term. As an alternative 
specification to using the expected value (E) to model the attractiveness of the gamble we 
include the amount to win and the amount to lose as two separate variables in all the models. The 12
results are similar. Panel B of Table 1 reports the results from estimating (1), yielding 
coefficients of 0.031 for G (t-value 2.07) and –0.030 for B (t-value –2.00). 
We then add subject specific regression constants, i.e., estimate a fixed effects linear 
probability model 
ij E j G ij B ij i ij yE G B c DE E E H      (2) 
where ci is the subject specific regression constant which captures between-subject variation in 
the tendency to participate in the gambles. Estimating (2), as reported in Panel B of Table 1, 
yields coefficients of 0.033 for G (t-value 2.37) and –0.031 for B (t-value –2.25). 
An analysis of a dichotomous dependent variable is frequently conducted with a logit model, 
an approach that we also follow. However, the interpretation of coefficients is less 
straightforward, and fixed effects estimation may cause problems, compared to the linear 
probability model. Our logit model relates the probability of subject i accepting gamble j to the 
explanatory variables as follows 
ln
1
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 (3) 
where pij is the probability that yij = 1 conditional on the explanatory variables. We estimate two 
types of unobserved effects models. 
First, a conditional fixed effects logit which additionally conditions the probabilities on a 
subject specific count of accepted gambles 
256
1
ii j
j
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 ¦ . We obtain robust standard errors by 
bootstrapping (50 repetitions). Panel B of Table 1 shows coefficients of 0.167 for G (z-value 
2.46) and –0.155 for B (z-value –2.64).13
Second, we estimate a subject random effects model. Maximum likelihood gives consistent 
and efficient estimates of a random effects model assuming that the unobserved effects do not 
correlate with the explanatory variables. As a control variable we include the subjects’ general 
risk attitude that was surveyed in the first part of the experiment, about a week prior to the main 
experiment. In this model we effectively assume that the probability of subject i accepting 
gamble j is as follows 
(1 )( , , , , ) ij j j ij ij i i py f EGBR D     (4) 
i.e., related to gamble characteristics (Ej), the musical condition prevailing during the decision 
(Gij and Bij), the subject’ general risk attitude (Ri), as well as the subject specific random effect 
(Di), and that the random effect remaining after controlling for Ri is independent of the 
explanatory variables. One can think of these random effects as deviations from the subjects’ 
baseline risk attitude, arising from day-to-day variation, or from differences in context specific 
reactions. We again use bootstrapped standard errors. Panel B of Table 1 shows coefficients of 
0.167 for G (z-value 3.03) and –0.154 for B (z-value –2.70). 
We aslo run a standard logit model for each subject separately estimating coefficients for the 
musical condition dummies and controlling for the expected value of the gamble. Each 
regression thus has 256 observations corresponding to the number of all different gambles. The 
coefficients for liked music are positive for 83% of the subjects and the coefficients for disliked 
music are negative for 74% of the subjects. The means of the coefficients across all subjects are 
similar to the coefficient estimates obtained by the other methods (0.17 for G and –0.17 for B),
and the median values of the coefficients are somewhat larger in absolute magnitude. We test for 
statistical significance of the averages of the individual G and B regression coefficients with a 14
standard t-test and obtain t-values of 2.51 (for G) and –2.61 (for B). These results are reported in 
Panel C of Table 1. 
6. Discussion 
This section first briefly discusses the role of subject demographics in this study. It then 
evaluates potential underlying psychological mechanisms, as well as discusses the theoretical 
implications of the results. 
The experimental subjects were teenagers, and musical preference is likely an important 
parameter in this demographic group. We acknowledge that the effect of music can be weaker 
for subjects for whom music plays a less important role. However, the importance of music does 
not necessarily decline with age. For example, Laukka (2007) reports that listening to music is a 
common leisure activity and a source of positive emotions for older adults, and Fox, Knight, and 
Zelinski (1998) show that music provides for an effective mood induction tool with older adults. 
Furthermore, more important than to specifically quantify the effect of music per se, the purpose 
of this paper is to study dynamic preference complementarities in general. 
Several theories in psychology propose mechanisms by which mood affects risk-taking. 
Mood maintenance theory—also referred to as mood regulation—says that people in good mood 
have more to lose compared to people in bad mood, and thus avoid taking risks with potential 
negative consequences that could erode their good mood. Correspondingly, people in negative 
mood may downplay the consequences of a bad outcome because they are already in a bad mood 
and thus have less to lose (Mischel, 1973; Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss, 1976; Isen and 
Simmonds, 1978; Leith and Baumeister, 1996). This theory is not valid in our setting since the 15
subjects did not observe the outcomes of the gambles until at the very end of the experiment. 
Furthermore, our results are opposite from the predictions of this theory. 
Subjective probability weighting can also be responsible for mood effects in risk-taking. 
People on positive moods generally assess bad outcomes as being less likely compared to people 
on negative moods (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Wright and Bower, 1992). However, in our case 
the probabilites stay constant and are easy to understand. Furthermore, subjective probability 
weighting should be less of an issue with the 50% probabilities that we use (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). It is thus unlikely that mood changes would impact the perception of 
probabilities in our experiment. 
The affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995) predicts that good mood should increase risk-taking 
and negative mood should depress risk-taking if the current mood primes access to memories of 
mood congruent outcomes from risky choices. However, this theory is predicted to apply in 
situations requiring considerable processing: selecting, learning, and interpreting new 
information about the risky situation, and incorporating it to existing knowledge and experiences. 
It is therefore unlikely that affect infusion strategies would be responsible for the rapid alteration 
of risk-taking tendency in our simple binomial gambles with constant probability. 
Mood states can also interplay with the type of cognitive processing strategies utilized, which 
might mediate the impact of mood on risk-taking. Schwarz and Bless (1991) argue that people 
are more likely to employ analytical problem-solving under negative moods, while more likely 
resorting to heuristics under positive moods. Forgas (1998) finds evidence in support of this 
hypothesis: subjects in sad mood made less attribution errors and made more effective use of 
memory relative to controls, while subjects in happy moods performed worse. However, our 
simple binary gambles do not require elaborate processing. In any case we find that subjects 16
listening to their favorite music, which arguably elevates their mood, if anything, perform closer 
to the normative benchmark of participating in all the gambles. That is, good music makes the 
subjects less loss-averse, and less biased in that sense. Our results are thus inconsistent with 
Schwarz and Bless (1991). They are, however, consistent with Isen and Labroo (2003) who 
argue that positive affect leads to better judgment. That idea may nevertheless have difficulty in 
accounting for the reduced risk-taking effect of bad music. 
Finally, we note that classical Pavlovian conditioning, nor a ‘hedonic forecasting 
mechanism’ leading to a biochemical response to cues and rewards discussed e.g. in Berheim 
and Rangel (2004, p. 1562), should be at work in our experiment. This is because in our 
experiment the gambles are only played at the end, so the outcomes can not affect choices. 
Although there is no such mechanism being created in the context of our experiment, it is 
nevertheless possible that such mechanisms have been at play earlier in life when musical 
preferences have formed. For example, consider a youngster who ventures to ask a girl of his 
dreams for a dance while a particular song is playing. An affirmative response could lead not 
only to liking the song, but also to associating the song with reward from taking risk. 
While psychological theories of mood driven changes in risk-taking have a hard time 
explaining our findings, the results on the whole are consistent with preference interactions of 
the type described by Laibson (1999) and Loewenstein (1996; 2000). Some earlier evidence on 
the effect of music could also be interpreted as being supportive of this idea. Herrington and 
Capella (1996) find that people spend more time and money in a supermarket when the 
background music conforms to their musical taste. Other studies find some evidence that 
classical music leads to higher sales in restaurants (North and Hargreaves, 1998; North, Shilcock, 
and Hargreaves, 2003). If the average restaurant customer prefers classical music, then these 17
results would be consistent with the idea that an enjoyable musical experience enhances the 
utility of restaurant consumption. 
7. Conclusion
Using an experimental setting which involves real money stakes, constant probabilities of 
winning, and rapid within-subject alteration of the type of background music, we find that 
hearing one’s favorite music playing increases risk-taking, and disliked music suppresses risk-
taking, compared to a baseline of no music. The difference in acceptance rates in favor of good 
music is about 10 percentage points along the diagonal of the payoff matrix. 
We interpret these results as suggesting that preference complementarities extending beyond 
the realm of goods and services are possible. Listening to one’s preferred music increases 
experienced utility per se, and simultaneously increases the marginal utility of participating in a 
gamble. Bad music, on the other hand, would lead to a marginal utility of taking the gamble that 
is lower than what prevails under silence. The preference-based interpretation of the results is 
supported by recent research in neuroscience. Berns et al. (2010) show that the activation in the 
reward areas of the brain are proportional to subjective ratings of music, and Halko et al. (2012) 
show that the behavioral effect of music on risk-taking co-varies with brain activation in left 
amygdala – a brain region known to be a key component of value computations. 
Preference complementarities can explain time-varying risk preferences. Earlier studies have 
attributed such effects on behavioral bias. We wish to point out that these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, however. How such preference complementarities would arise provides a 
potential topic for future research. Understanding the formation of preferences is a central issue 
in economics. 18
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Table 1 
The effect of music on risk-taking, statistical tests 
Panel A shows the mean acceptance rates of binary gambles in which subjects (N = 23) could either when or lose 
money with equal probability. The number of observations for each subject is 256, of which 128 are for ‘No music’, 
64 are for ‘Favorite music’, and 64 are for ‘Disliked music’. Panel B. shows results from four different regression 
models testing the effect of the musical condition on the decision to accept the gamble. T-statistics (z-statistics for 
logit regressions) are presented below the coefficients. In calculating the t-statistics we use standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity in all analyses. For fixed effects and random effects models such standard errors are obtained with 
bootstrapping. Panel C. shows results from running separate Logit regressions for each subject (256 observations in 
each regression), and taking averages of the subject-specific coefficients. The t-statistics in Panel C are from a 
standard  t-test of means. All regressions include the expected value of the gamble as a control variable (not 
reported). Statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated by **. 
Panel A. Mean acceptance rate          
  Favorite music  No music  Disliked music 
 0.541  0.514  0.474 
Difference compared to ‘No music’  0.027    -0.040 
Difference between ‘Favorite music’ and    0.067   
‘Disliked  music’     
     
Panel B. Tests of differences in acceptance compared to ‘No music’       
Linear probability model (OLS)  0.031**    -0.03** 
 2.07    -2.00 
     
OLS with subject fixed effects  0.033**    -0.031** 
 2.37    -2.25 
     
Logit, conditional subject fixed effects  0.167**    -0.155** 
 2.46    -2.64 
     
Logit, subject random effects 0.167**    -0.154** 
 3.03    -2.70 
     
Panel C. Subject-specific Logit regressions          
Mean coefficient  0.169**    -0.168** 
 2.51        -2.62 23
Figure 1 (black and white). (A) Exemplary computer screen plot from the experiment. The task of the subjects was 
to accept or reject gambles that offered a 50–50 chance of gaining or losing money. Gains ranged from 1 to 4 euros 
and losses from 0.5 to 2 euros. (B) The payoff matrix comprised 256 different gambles. The 256 gambles were 
divided into 16 sets of 16 gambles each. Within a set, the 16 gambles were scattered around the payoff matrix such 
that only one gamble came from each of the separate 4 by 4 areas in the matrix. The two different shades of grey 
rectangles in the figure represent two examples of a set of gambles. (C) Subjects played 16 different blocks, 16 
gambles in each block, and a block with music was always followed by a block without music. To keep subjects’ 
attention high and to avoid unreflected automatic response we varied the length of the interval between the gambles 
(from 0.5 to 3.5 seconds). 24
Figure 2 (color). (A) The distribution of risk attitude; 0 = not willing to take risk, 10 = completely willing to take 
risk. The average willingness to take risk was 5.07 (SD = 1.92). (B) Payoff matrix and mean acceptance rates, all 
gambles. 
Figure 3 (black and white). Acceptance rates under liked music (solid line) and disliked music (dotted line) as a 
function of the win-loss –ratio of the gambles. The win-loss –ratio is formed by dividing the potential win amount 
by the potential loss amount. 25
Figure 4 (color). Payoff matrix and mean acceptance rates in two conditions: subjectively disliked music and liked 
music. In a 2 by 4 by 4 ANOVA (music, gain, loss), the main effect of music (disliked vs. liked) on the mean 
acceptance rate was statistically significant (F(1,22) = 12.04, p = 0.002), likewise main effects of gain (F(3,66) = 
102.04, p < 0.001) and loss (F(3,66) = 94.47, p < 0.001). As expected, the interaction was between gain and loss was 
significant (F(9,198) = 5.09, p < 0.001); none of the interactions with music was significant. CFS Working Paper Series: 
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